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TORTS-NUISANCE-PERSONAL ANNOYANCE AS SOLE INJURY-Several thou-
sand sales slips, mistakenly printed to bear plaintiff's telephone number, 
were supplied to the defendant store and were circulated widely by the 
latter's employees incident to normal sales transactions. Calls from defend-
ant's customers soon burdened plaintiff's telephone, and despite numerous 
complaints by plaintiff over a two-year period, defendant refused or neg-
lected to terminate use of the incorrect slips. On appeal from judgment 
for plaintiff in a suit for damages, held, affirmed. Defendant's acts resulted 
in an actual invasion of plaintiff's right to enjoy her property without 
unreasonable interference. Damages for personal annoyance and incon-
venience alone are allowable in a nuisance action. Brillhardt v. Ben Tipp, 
inc., (Wash. 1956) 297 P. (2d) 232. 
The recognition of telephone annoyance as a nuisance in the principal 
case is demonstrative of the extent to which this elusive tort has been ex-
panded since its inception as an action involving continuing physical 
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invasion of land.1 Today annoyance and inconvenience are widely recog-
nized as proper elements of damage in a nuisance action and frequently 
emerge as the sole basis upon which a damage recovery is predicated.2 
Seldom do courts distinguish those causes in which discomfort alone is 
alleged as injury, as in the principal case, and those in which it merely 
accompanies such traditional nuisance harms as physical injury to land 
and fixtures, depreciation of property value, or creation of conditions dele-
terious to health.3 Such a tendency exists in the area of nuisance in sharp 
contrast with contemporary general tort doctrines rigidly restricting suits 
for emotional disturbance recovery as an independent cause of action.¼ 
That annoyance and inconvenience may be the sole elements of damage 
is perhaps explained by the peculiar nature of the private nuisance theory. 
Once having defined the essence of nuisance as "interference with use and 
enjoyment of land,"6 the courts apparently felt that it would be antithetical 
to bar a plaintiff who shows only annoyance caused by such interference. 
It is significant that annoyance and inconvenience are often scrupulously 
distinguished from other forms of emotional distress6 as perhaps importing 
more of a physical, as distinct from mental, characteristic than pure mental 
disturbance, 7 thereby appearing less susceptible of counterfeit by the super-
sensitive or avaricious plaintiff. Thus unpleasant odors,8 sights,O and 
noises10 have provided grounds for nuisance recovery solely upon a show-
ing of substantial11 annoyance, harassment, inconvenience, or discomfort. 
Yet whatever justification for these decisions is to be found in the atypic 
1 A comprehensive discussion of the history and suggested limitations of the nuisance 
doctrine is found in PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 389 et seq. (1955). 
2 E.g., Baltimore &: Potomac R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317 (1883); 
Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157 Cal. 168, 106 P. 581 (1910); Chandler v. 
City of Olney, 126 Tex. 230, 87 S.W. (2d) 250 (1935). · 
3 E.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ruble, 191 Okla. 37, 126 P. (2d) 526 (1942). See 
also 4 TORTS REsrATEMENT §929, comment g (1939); 142 A.L.R. 1316 (1943). 
4 "One who, by extreme and outrageous conduct, intentionally or recklessly causes 
seyere emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress ••• " 
[Tentative Draft of §46 (1), SECOND TORTS R=ATEMENT] cited in Prosser, "Insult and 
Outrage," 44 CALIF. L. REv. 40 at 43 (1956) as representative of the current tenor of 
American decisions. Cf. TORTS REsrATEMENT (Supp. 1948) §46. 
11 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 405 (1955). 
6 "This interest in freedom from annoyance and discomfort in the use of land is 
to be distinguished from the interest in freedom from emotional distress. • . • The 
latter is purely an interest of personality and receives very limited legal protection, 
whereas the former is essentially an interest in the usability of land and, although it 
involves an element of personal tastes and sensibilities, it receives much greater legal 
protection.'' 4 TORTS REsrATEMENT §822, comment e (1939). 
7 Chicago, Indianapolis and Louisville R. Co. v. Ader, 184 Ind. 235, HO N.E. 67 (1915). 
s E.g., Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., note 2 supra; Holdenville v. Kiser, 
195 Okla. 189, 156 P. (2d) 363 (1945). 
9 Brough v. Ute Stampede Assn., 105 Utah 446, 142 P. (2d) 670 (1943). Contra, 
Houston, E. &: W.T. Ry. Co. v. Reasonover, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 274, 81 S.W. 329 (1904). 
10 E.g., Baltimore and Potomac R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, note 2 supra. 
11 A trifling annoyance is not sufficient. Reynolds v. Community Fuel _Co., 309 Ky. 
716, 218 S.W. (2d) 950 (1949). Cf. People v. Northum, 41 Cal. App. (2d) 284, 106 P. 
(2d) 433 (1940). 
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nature of nuisance as a tort concept concerning itself with the effect of 
conduct rather than with the conduct itself,12 their consequence has been 
to divorce from the traditional injury to property, a form of mental dis-
tress for which an independent damage action will lie, albeit within the 
nuisance framework. Such a separation poses the rather fundamental ques-
tion, Does defendant, by inducing annoyance, invade a proprietary or per-
sonal interest? The court's opinion in the principal case is indicative of 
the hopeless confusion and conflict on this issue-damages are awarded for 
"personal" annoyance upon an invasion of plaintiff's "right to enjoy her 
property."13 If such injury is personal, no perceptible reason exists for 
limiting the nuisance action to cases involving the use of realty. The basis 
of the tort would, in fact, assume remarkable similarity to a substantial 
body of right of privacy decisions in which mental suffering caused by 
intentional invasion of plaintiff's solitude has been held compensable.14 
Although evolved to cope with unwarranted publicity of private affairsP 
the privacy action has often been successfully litigated where no act of 
publication is alleged.16 A recent Ohio decision upon facts fundamentally 
analogous to those in the principal case, awarded substantial damages for 
an invasion of privacy through "a deliberately initiated systematic cam-
paign to harass" by telephone.17 Recovery on a nuisance theory would 
appear to have been equally plausible, as indeed it might in a number of 
the privacy cases cited, and conversely, the requirement of intent is the 
only aspect of the privacy concept preventing assimilation of the entire 
12 VI-A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §28.24 (1954). 
13 297 P. (2d) 232 at 235 (1956) (emphasis added). The editors of the TORTS RE-
STATEMENT clearly indicate preference for the "proprietary" position, note 6 supra. But 
see Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Martini, 2 Ala. App. 652 at 661, 56 S. 830 (1911): 
"Any condition which created annoyance and inconvenience to appellee while in his 
home was an offense against his person-a personal injury." Supporting the latter view, 
see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ruble, note 3 supra. 
14Exhaustive annotations of the history .and nature of the action appear in 138 
A.L.R. 22 (1942) and 168 A.L.R. 446 (1947). 
15 See generally Warren and Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,'' 4 HARV. L. REv. 
193 at 195 et seq. (1890). Compare Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 
50 S.E. 68 (1905), with Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 
442 (1902), on the question of the need for creating such a right. 
16 "An invasion of the right of privacy may result without the matter being brought 
to the attention of the general public." Housh v. Peth, (Ohio App. 1955) 135 N.E. 
(2d) 440 at 448. See also PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 637 (1955). In the following cases, an 
invasion of privacy was recognized in absence of the usual element of publicization: 
Welsh v. Roehm, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P. (2d) 816 (1952) (oppressive conduct by landlord); 
Walker v. Whittle, 83 Ga. App. 445, 64 S.E. (2d) 87 (1951) (unlawful search and seizure); 
State ex rel. Clemens v. Witthaus, 360 Mo. 274, 228 S.W. (2d) 4 (1950) (unjustifiably 
broad judicial order to produce papers). 
17 Housh v. Peth, note 16 supra, at 442, in which a creditor made numerous tele-
phone calls to plaintiff for a three-week period in an effort to coerce payment of a debt. 
An element of publication to plaintiff's employer was present but the court was ipecific 
that its decision did not tum on this factor. See cases cited note 16 supra. 
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body of nuisance cases involving annoyance.18 The similarity between the 
two theories shows how artificial rigid tort classifications may be in the 
realm of mental suffering, and suggests the irrelevance of denominating 
an interest as either personal or proprietary where emotional disturbance 
is involved. More significantly, it indicates that the presently accepted 
requisites of recovery for independent emotional disturbance-intentional 
and outrageous conduct by defendant and extreme shock in plaintiff1°-
may eventually be destroyed by the more realistic approach of the nuisance 
theory, to the extent that any unreasonable infliction of substantial emo-
tional disturbance will be actionable. 
Michael Scott 
18 The right of privacy "appears in reality to be a complex _of four distinct wrongs, 
which have little in common • • . • One of these torts consists of intrusion upon the 
plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion ..•• " PROSSER, ToRTS, 2d ed., 637 (1955). Ironically, 
the privacy concept was in its inception one involving proprietary interests. See Prince 
Albert v. Strange, 1 Mac. & G. 25, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (1849). See 29 TEJC. L. REv. 976 
(1951), for a recent discussion of the roots of the right. 
19 Note 4 supra. 
